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THE ISIS CRISIS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
Johan D. van der Vyver∗ 
ABSTRACT 
This Article is focused on efforts to accommodate, within the confines of 
international humanitarian law, militant responses to acts of cross-border 
terror violence, as exemplified in most recent times by atrocities committed by 
the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) and its successor, the Islamic State 
in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Since World War I (1914-1918), the international 
community of States sought to commit itself to settle international disputes by 
peaceful means and not through the power of the sword. The Charter of the 
United Nations (U.N. Charter) seemingly confined legitimate armed 
interventions to those authorized by the Security Council to bring to an end 
situations that constitute a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act 
of aggression (Article 42), and instances of self-defense where a Member State 
has been attacked (Article 51). However, over time jus ad bellum has extended 
legitimate armed interventions well beyond the confines of the U.N. Charter to 
also include armed interventions authorized by the General Assembly in very 
special circumstances—wars of liberation, pre-emptive self-defense action, 
and humanitarian intervention. It has also come to be accepted that a 
government confronted by insurgents can invite other States to come to its 
assistance. Iraq has indeed done so, and therefore the airstrikes against ISIS 
strongholds by, for example, American forces in Iraq, are lawful under the 
norms and customs of contemporary international humanitarian law. 
However, the United States has also launched airstrikes against al-Qaeda 
and ISIS targets in Syria while not having been requested by the Syrian 
government to do so. In order to afford legality to those airstrikes, members of 
the Obama Administration have proposed a new rule of humanitarian law, the 
“unwilling or unable rationale,” proclaiming that armed forces of State A can 
take military action against terrorist groups located in State B if the 
government of State B is either unwilling or unable to prevent its territory from 
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being a launching pad for acts of terror violence. Although some proponents of 
the unwilling or unable rationale attempted to bring the legality of such 
military action within the confines of self-defense action or humanitarian 
intervention, this Article argues that the unwilling or unable rationale does not 
fit the standard conditions of legitimate self-defense or the essential objectives 
of humanitarian intervention. The Article concludes that the unwilling or 
unable rationale is a new norm of jus ad bellum in the making. 
A side issue of the Article addresses the question of why spokespersons of 
the Obama Administration persist in referring to ISIL in spite of the fact that 
the organization in June 2014 changed its name to ISIS. It is noted that al-
Qaeda was part of ISIL but is not part of ISIS, that the Obama Administration 
did not receive congressional approval for the airstrikes in the Middle East, 
and that the Obama Administration relies on congressional approval of the 
post 9/11 war against terror that was focused on the Taliban and al-Qaeda 
forces in Afghanistan and the 2003 invasion of Iraq to afford constitutional 
legality to the airstrikes in Iraq and Syria. Since al-Qaeda was part of ISIL but 
not of ISIS, referring to ISIL is most likely intended to bring these airstrikes 
within the reach of the congressional approvals of yesteryear. 
INTRODUCTION 
The international community was shocked in the extreme in recent years by 
acts of profound barbarism committed by a militant Muslim group, initially 
called the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) but who changed its 
name in June 2014 to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).1 The 
organization is committed to the dictates of a certain brand of the Sunni faction 
of Islam and strives toward bringing most traditionally Muslim-inhabited 
States―besides Iraq and Syria―under its political control, including Jordan, 
Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Cyprus, and Southern Turkey.2 It acquired 
considerable financial resources by gaining control of oil fields in the eastern 
province of Deir-al-Zour in Iraq, taking control of bank institutions and 
 
 1 For the history, goals, and evil deeds of ISIL/ISIS, see Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), 
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Nov. 16, 2015), http://www.britannica.com/topic/Islamic-State-in-Iraq-and-the-
Levant; Syria Iraq: The Islamic State Militant Group, BBC NEWS (Aug. 2, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/ 
world-middle-east-24179084;. 
 2 See Anne Allmeling, Isis Threatening to Redraw Mideast Borders, DEUTSCHE WELLE (July 28, 2014), 
http://www.dw.com/en/isis-threatening-to-redraw-mideast-borders/a-17811889; Daniella Peled, What is ISIS? 
The Rise of a Military Islamic ‘Caliphate,’ HAARETZ (Nov. 23, 2015, 2:41 PM), http://www.haaretz.com/ 
middle-east-news/isis/1.687819. 
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allocating to itself large sums of money, and receiving generous funding from 
wealthy donors in predominantly Sunni countries of the Persian Gulf.3 It lured 
into its ranks thousands of foreign volunteers, including some from the United 
States (U.S.) and the United Kingdom.4 In order to achieve its political 
objectives, the organization has embarked on horrific acts of terror violence.5 
A key question for purposes of this survey is what military action can be 
taken by the international community of States, or by individual sovereignties, 
to combat the threat emanating from the crime of aggression and the acts of 
terror violence committed by proponents of ISIL/ISIS. We shall see that 
existing norms of jus ad bellum do not unconditionally authorize military 
intervention across national borders against ISIS strongholds. However, 
international humanitarian law is currently in the making of what has come to 
be denoted as the “unwilling or unable” paradigm, which is aimed at 
authorizing military action by State A against terrorist groups located in State 
B if the government of State B is either unwilling or unable to prevent its 
territory from being used as a launching pad for acts of terror violence.6 
Although proponents of the unwilling or unable paradigm sought to bring the 
military response against the perpetrators of terror violence under the rubric of 
the right to self-defense,7 this Article will show the implementation of the 
paradigm is not confined to situations that warrant defensive military action. 
A particular focus of this Article is airstrikes by military forces of the 
United States against selected targets in Iraq and Syria, which have come to be 
justified on the basis of the unwilling or unable paradigm. There are very 
special reasons why (a) the American airstrikes are not only confined to ISIS 
strongholds in Iraq but also include al-Qaeda targets in Syria, and (b) 
spokespersons of the Obama Administration continue to refer to ISIL, as the 
 
 3 See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, FINANCING OF THE TERRORIST ORGANISATION ISLAMIC STATE IN IRAQ 
AND THE LEVANT (ISIL) 5, 13, 18–19 (Feb. 2015), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/ 
Financing-of-the-terrorist-organisation-ISIL.pdf. 
 4 See, e.g., Peter R. Neumann, Foreign Fighter Total in Syria/Iraq Now Exceeds 20,000; Surpasses 
Afghanistan Conflict in the 1980s, INT’L CTR. FOR STUDY RADICALISATION & POL. VIOLENCE (Jan. 26, 2015), 
http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-
1980s/; Mary Anne Weaver, Her Majesty’s Jihadists, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2015/04/19/magazine/her-majestys-jihadists.html; Robert Windrem, ISIS By the Numbers: 
Foreign Fighter Total Keeps Growing, NBC NEWS (Feb. 28, 2015, 8:50 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/ 
storyline/isis-terror/isis-numbers-foreign-fighter-total-keeps-growing-n314731. 
 5 E.g., Peled, supra note 2. 
 6 See, e.g., Ashley S. Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative Framework for 
Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 483, 486 (2012). 
 7 See id. at 492–93. 
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terror group called itself before it changed its name to ISIS in June 2014. It 
will be argued in this Article that both (a) and (b) stem from the fact that the 
Obama Administration did not obtain congressional approval for the airstrikes 
in the Middle East as required by the U.S. Constitution and maintained that the 
airstrikes are covered by, amongst other things, the congressional approval of a 
military response to the terror attacks of September 11th orchestrated by al-
Qaeda. From this Article, it will emerge that al-Qaeda was a component of 
ISIL but not of ISIS, and therefore the Obama Administration had to include 
armed attacks against al-Qaeda, and kept on referring to ISIL, to afford 
credence to its reliance on the congressional approval of an armed response to 
the War on Terror sparked by the acts of terror violence of 9/11. 
Following a brief historical synopsis in Part I of this Article on the 
emergence of ISIL/ISIS and of its evil deeds, we shall in Part II deal with the 
current dictates of jus ad bellum signifying the confines of lawful armed 
interventions. It will be pointed out that the Charter of the United Nations 
(U.N. Charter) confined the use of armed force to (a) U.N. Security Council 
authorizations of action by air, sea, or land forces as a means of maintaining or 
restoring international peace and security (Article 42),8 and (b) individual and 
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs (Article 51).9 However, this 
Article argues that efforts to confine armed conflicts to the instances specified 
in the U.N. Charter have fallen behind the times, and the international 
community of States has consequently come to afford legality to the use of 
armed force in situations other than those specified in Articles 42 and 51, such 
as preemptive self-defense measures, wars of liberation, and humanitarian 
interventions. 
In Part III, this Article pays special attention to the ISIS crisis and the 
shortcomings of international humanitarian law in counteracting terrorism of 
the kind and on the scale orchestrated by ISIS. This Part focuses especially on: 
(a) the airstrikes by U.S. armed forces against al-Qaeda and ISIS targets in Iraq 
and Syria; (b) problems affording legality to those airstrikes within the 
confines of U.S. constitutional law and of jus ad bellum; and (c) the evolution 
of a rule of international humanitarian law to accommodate an offensive 
against the perpetrators of terror violence if the government of the country 
from which they operate is either unwilling or unable to take action to combat 
the acts of terror violence. 
 
 8 U.N. Charter art. 42. 
 9 Id. art. 51. 
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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The history of the Sunni insurgent group, commonly referred to as the 
“Islamic State” (IS), or more precisely over time as the “Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria” (ISIS), the “Islamic State of Iraq and Levant” (ISIL), or DAESH 
(an abbreviation of the Arab name of ISIL), can be traced back to 2004, the 
year in which it originated under the name of Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad,10 a 
forerunner of Tanzim Al Qaeda fi Bilad al-Rafidayn, commonly known as al-
Qaeda in Iraq.11 The organization made great progress in 2006 when it joined 
other Sunni insurgent groups to form the Mujahideen Shura Council, which 
over time consolidated into the Islamic State of Iraq, and had acquired a 
substantial presence in Al Anbar, Nineveh, and Kirkut.12 In 2013, the group 
changed its name to ISIL.13 ISIL made great progress under the leadership of 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, largely due to political practices that many of its 
followers regarded as discrimination against the Sunni faction of Islam.14 Until 
February 2014, ISIL had close ties with al-Qaeda, but following a power 
struggle, al-Qaeda cut all ties with the group.15 On June 29, 2014, ISIL, absent 
al-Qaeda support, was renamed to ISIS.16 
ISIL/ISIS strictly imposes Islamic punishments such as amputations, 
beheadings, and crucifixions, and it has become notorious on account of 
innumerable acts of extreme terror violence.17 The beheadings of American 
journalist James Foley, American/Israeli journalist Steven Sotloff, British 
 
 10 Aaron Y. Zelin, The War Between ISIS and al-Qaeda for Supremacy of the Global Jihadist Movement, 
RESEARCH NOTES (The Wash. Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, D.C.), June 2014, at 1.  
 11 See Robert G. Rabil, The ISIS Chronicles: A History, NAT’L INT. (July 17, 2014), 
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-isis-chronicles-history-10895. 
 12 Bill Roggio, The Rump Islamic Emirate of Iraq, LONG WAR J. (Oct. 16, 2006), http://www. 
longwarjournal.org/archives/2006/10/the_rump_islamic_emi.php; Test Tube, What is ISIS and What Do They 
Want in Iraq?, CARTOGRACY (June 19, 2014), http://cartogracy.com/conflict/islamic-state/watch/103. 
 13 Syria Iraq: The Islamic State Militant Group, supra note 1. 
 14 See Bobby Gosh, ISIS: A Short History, ATLANTIC (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
international/archive/2014/08/isis-a-short-history/376030/ (detailing ISIL’s growth under al-Baghdadi’s 
command); see also Lina Khatib, The Islamic State’s Strategy: Lasting and Expanding, CARNEGIE MIDDLE E. 
CTR. (June 29, 2015), http://carnegie-mec.org/2015/06/29/islamic-state-s-strategy-lasting-and-expanding/ib5x 
(detailing the perceived discrimination against Sunnis after the United States’ invasion of Iraq); Mapping 
Militant Organizations: The Islamic State, STAN. U., https://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-
bin/groups/view/1 (last updated May 15, 2015).  
 15 Oliver Holmes, Al Qaeda Breaks Link with Syrian Militant Group ISIL, REUTERS (Feb. 3, 2013, 8:33 
AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-qaeda-idUSBREA120NS20140203; Zelin, supra note 10. 
 16 Mapping Militant Organizations: The Islamic State, supra note 14. 
 17 See, e.g., Graeme Wood, What ISIS Really Wants, ATLANTIC (Mar. 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/. 
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humanitarian aid worker David Haines, American humanitarian aid worker 
Peter Kassig, British taxi driver and humanitarian aid worker Alan Henning, 
and Japanese journalist Kenji Goto,18 and the burning to death of Jordanian 
pilot Moath al-Kasasbeh,19 were videotaped and displayed on the Internet for 
the world to see. On February 15, 2015, ISIS publicly displayed the beheading 
in Libya of twenty-one Egyptian Coptic Christian fishermen.20 On March 29, 
2015, a video was released showing the beheading of eight men said to be 
Shiite Muslims.21 ISIS was also responsible for the destruction of valuable 
religious shrines and works of art that were of special significance to rival 
Islamic factions.22 
In August 2014, the U.N. Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the 
U.N. Charter, deplored and condemned “in the strongest terms the terrorist acts 
of ISIL and its violent extremist ideology, and its continuous gross, systematic 
and widespread abuses of human rights and violations of international 
humanitarian law.”23 In September 2014, the European Parliament in a similar 
vein condemned “the atrocities threatened or committed by ISIS against 
various groups not sharing their convictions, above all religious and ethnic 
minorities such as Christians, Yezidi, Shabak and Turkmen, but also Shiites 
and Sunnis,” and denounced “the odious assassination by ISIS of two 
American journalists and a British aid worker.”24 
ISIL/ISIS was proclaimed a terrorist organization by the United States (on 
December 17, 2004),25 Australia (on March 2, 2005),26 Canada (on August 20, 
 
 18 Nadia Khomami, Mohammed Emwazi: Who Were His Victims?, GUARDIAN (Nov. 13, 2015, 7:15 
AM), http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/nov/13/mohammed-emwazi-who-were-his-victims. 
 19 Jordan Pilot Hostage Moaz al-Kasasbeh ‘burned alive,’ BBC NEWS (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.bbc. 
com/news/world-middle-east-31121160. 
 20 John J. Xenakis, Worldview: Egypt in Mourning as ISIS-Linked Terrorists Kill Coptic Christians in 
Libya, BREIBART (Feb. 16, 2015), http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2015/02/16/world-view-egypt-
in-mourning-as-isis-linked-terrorists-kill-coptic-christians-in-libya/. 
 21 William M. Welch, Islamic State Beheads 8, Led to Death by Teens, USA TODAY (Mar. 30, 2015, 7:30 
AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/03/29/islamic-state-beheads-eight-men/70635014/. 
 22 See, e.g., Susannah Cullinane et al., Tracking a Trail of Historical Obliteration: ISIS Trumpets 
Destruction of Nimrud, CNN (Apr. 13, 2015, 8:43 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/09/world/iraq-isis-
heritage/. 
 23 S.C. Res. 2170, ¶ 1 (Aug. 15, 2014). 
 24 Motion for a Resolution to Wind Up the Debate on the Statement by the Vice-President of the 
Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Pursuant to Rule 
123(2) of the Rules of Procedure on the Situation in Iraq and Syria and the ISIS Offensive (2014/2843(RSP)), 
EUR. PARL. DOC. B8-0110/2014 (2014). 
 25 Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. DEP’T ST., http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2016). 
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2012),27 Turkey (in October 2013),28 Saudi Arabia (on March 7, 2014),29 the 
United Kingdom (in June 2014),30 Indonesia (on August 1, 2014),31 the United 
Arab Emirates (on August 20, 2014),32 Israel (on September 3, 2014),33 
Malaysia (on September 24, 2014),34 Egypt (on November 30, 2014),35 India 
(on December 16, 2014),36 the Russian Federation (on December 29, 2014),37 
Kyrgyzstan (on March 16, 2015),38 and Pakistan (on August 29, 2015).39 ISIS 
is furthermore banned in Germany (since September 2014)40 and Switzerland 
(since October 2014).41 Switzerland’s ban prohibits propaganda in favor of, 
and financial support for, ISIS in Switzerland.42 The terrorist acts of ISIS in 
 
 26 Listed Terrorist Organizations, AUSTL. NAT’L SECURITY, http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/ 
Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 3, 2016). 
 27 Currently Listed Entities, PUB. SAFETY CAN. (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-
scrt/cntr-trrrsm/lstd-ntts/crrnt-lstd-ntts-eng.aspx#2005. 
 28 Ceylan Ozbudak, Resolving the ISIS Crisis from a Turkish Viewpoint, AL ARABIYA NEWS (Sept. 6, 
2014), http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2014/09/06/Resolving-the-ISIS-crisis-from-a-
Turkish-perspective.html. 
 29 Rania El Gamal, Saudi Arabia Designates Muslim Brotherhood Terrorist Group, REUTERS (Mar. 7, 
2014, 12:48 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-security-idUSBREA260SM20140307. 
 30 Proscribed Terrorist Organisations, U.K. GOV’T HOME OFF., https://www.gov.uk/government/ 
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/472956/Proscription-update-20151030.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 
2016). 
 31 BNPT Declares ISIS a Terrorist Organization, TEMPO.CO (Aug. 2, 2014), http://en.tempo.co/read/ 
news/2014/08/02/055596766/BNPT-Declares-ISIS-a-Terrorist-Organization. 
 32 List of Terror Groups Published by UAE, GULF NEWS (Nov. 16, 2014, 4:01 PM), http://gulfnews.com/ 
news/uae/government/list-of-terror-groups-published-by-uae-1.1413219. 
 33 Michelle Grossman, Islamic State Officially Outlawed in Israel, JERUSALEM POST (Mar. 9, 2014, 9:23 
PM), http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Islamic-State-officially-outlawed-in-Israel-374348. 
 34 Zakir Hussain & Shannon Teoh, ISIS Fighters from M’sia, Indonesia Form Military Unit, JAKARTA 
POST (Sept. 26, 2014, 11:34 AM), http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/09/26/isis-fighters-msia-
indonesia-form-military-unit.html. 
 35 Adham Youssef, Court Affirms ISIS’ ‘Terrorist Group’ Designation, DAILY NEWS EGYPT (Nov. 30, 
2014), http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/11/30/court-affirms-isis-terrorist-group-designation/. 
 36 India Bans Islamic State Terror Group, HINDU (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.thehindu.com/news/ 
national/indian-government-bans-islamic-state-terror-organisation/article6698369.ece. 
 37 Russia Calls on All States to Put Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra on Terrorist Lists, TASS RUSS. NEWS 
AGENCY (Dec. 29, 2014), http://tass.ru/en/world/769912. 
 38 Joanna Paraszczuk, Kyrgyzstan Bans IS, Designates it as Terror Group, RADIO FREE EUR. RADIO 
LIBERTY (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.rferl.org/content/kyrgyzstan-bans-islamic-state/26920328.html. 
 39 Zahid Gishkori, Islamic State Listed Among Proscribed Outfits, EXPRESS TRIB. (Aug. 29, 2015), 
http://tribune.com.pk/story/946859/banned-organisations-is-listed-among-proscribed-outfits/.  
 40 Melissa Eddy, Germany Bans Support for Isis, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/09/13/world/europe/germany-bans-support-of-isis.html?_r=0. 
 41 Switzerland Bans ISIL, ANADOLU AGENCY (Oct. 8, 2014), http://aa.com.tr/en/world/switzerland-bans-
isil/112768. 
 42 Id. 
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Iraq were also condemned by Syria,43 while Jordan in February 2015 made its 
condemnation of the organization known by launching airstrikes against ISIS 
targets.44 
It is perhaps important to note at the outset that although the militant group, 
absent al-Qaeda support, changed its name from ISIL to ISIS in June 2014, 
President Barack Obama and other spokespersons of the U.S. Department of 
State persist in referring to the group as ISIL.45 This is probably not due to lack 
of information on the part of spokespersons of the American government, but it 
can most likely be attributed to a special problem of the Obama 
Administration, namely that it has not received congressional approval for the 
airstrikes in the Middle East but relied on the congressional approval of the 
War on Terror that was sparked by the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 
which were orchestrated by al-Qaeda.46 Relying on congressional approval for 
the War on Terror and consequently referring to ISIL instead of ISIS will be 
alluded to later on in this Article. 
II. JUS AD BELLUM 
“The history of humankind has been the history of wars.”47 This 
assessment of human history by Benjamin Ferencz, Chief Prosecutor in the 
Einsatzgruppen Case at Nuremberg in which twenty-two high-ranking Nazi 
officials were prosecuted and convicted for slaughtering more than a million 
innocent men, women, and children,48 can unfortunately not be faulted. As 
noted by Theodor Meron in his analysis of the (futile) attempts to apply human 
rights principles in situations of armed conflict: “To genuinely humanize 
 
 43 H. Zain & M. Ismael, Syria Condemns Terrorist Acts in Iraq, Expresses Solidarity with Iraqi 
Government, Army and People, SYRIAN ARAB NEWS AGENCY (June 11, 2014), http://sana.sy/en/?p=2988. 
 44 Jordan Continues Their Revenge on ISIS Carrying Out Airstrikes Against the Terror Group, 
NEWS.COM.AU (Feb. 6, 2015, 10:09 AM), http://www.news.com.au/world/middle-east/jordan-continues-their-
revenge-on-isis-carrying-out-airstrikes-against-the-terror-group/news-story/b0dce593af0f349afff96e737ae 
4afbe. 
 45 Adam Withnall, Iraq Crisis: ISIS Declares its Territories a New Islamic State With ‘Restoration of 
Caliphate’ in Middle East, INDEPENDENT (June 30, 2014), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-
east/isis-declares-new-islamic-state-in-middle-east-with-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-as-emir-removing-iraq-and-
9571374.html. 
 46 Charles Stimson, A Framework for an Authorization for Use of Military Force Against ISIS, HERITAGE 
FOUND. (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/09/a-framework-for-an-authorization-
for-use-of-military-force-against-isis. 
 47 Benjamin B. Ferencz, Illegal Armed Force as a Crime Against Humanity (June 2015), 
http://www.benferencz.org/2010-2015.html#illegalarmed. 
 48 “The Einsatzgruppen Case,” in 4 TRIALS OF THE WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY 
TRIBUNAL UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 3–596 (1951). 
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humanitarian law, it would be necessary to put an end to all kinds of armed 
conflicts. But wars have been a part of the human condition since the struggle 
between Cain and Abel, and regrettably they are likely to remain so.”49 In more 
recent times, however, international humanitarian law was set on a course to 
limit the use of armed force as a means of settling international disputes as 
much as possible. 
A. Limitation of the Use of Armed Force 
Following World War I, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aristide 
Briand, took the initiative in proposing a bilateral agreement between the 
United States and France to outlaw war between those two countries.50 U.S. 
President Calvin Coolidge and Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg proposed 
instead that France and the United States take the lead in inviting all nations to 
join them in outlawing war between States.51 It was understood that the pact 
would only apply to acts of aggression and not to military actions taken in self-
defense.52 On August 27, 1928, fifteen nations signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact, 
also known as the Pact of Paris.53 Besides France and the United States, the 
signatory States included Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, 
Germany, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Poland, South Africa, and 
the United Kingdom.54 The signatories condemned recourse to war for the 
solution of international controversies and undertook to settle all disputes, 
without exception, by pacific means.55 
Frank Kellogg received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1929 for his contribution 
to the signing of the Pact of Paris.56 However, most regrettably, the pact did 
not achieve its noble objective. The 1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 
mainland China denoted the first crack in the wall of peace, and the aggressive 
expansionism of Germany and Italy within that same time frame eventually 
 
 49 Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 239, 240 (2000). 
 50 Office of the Historian, The Kellogg-Briand Pact, 1928, DEP’T ST., https://history.state.gov/ 
milestones/1921-1936/kellogg (last visited Jan. 20, 2016) [hereinafter Office of the Historian].  
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy arts. 1–2, Aug. 27, 1928, 
94 L.N.T.S. 57 [hereinafter Kellogg-Briand Pact]; Office of the Historian, supra note 50. 
 54 Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 53, pmbl.; Office of the Historian, supra note 50. 
 55 Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 53, arts. 1–2.  
 56 Office of the Historian, supra note 50. 
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culminated in World War II (1939-1945).57 Following World War II, renewed 
efforts emerged to maintain peace and security in the world. 
The United Nations was founded in 1945 “to save succeeding generations 
from the scourge of war” and to that end, to unite the strength of its Members 
“to maintain international peace and security” and to ensure “that armed force 
shall not be used, save in the common interest.”58 It called on Member States 
to “settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that 
international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.”59 It recorded 
in Article 2, paragraph 4 of the U.N. Charter a commitment of all Member 
States to “refrain . . . from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”60 Those purposes 
include a resolve 
[t]o maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take 
effective collective measures . . . for the suppression of acts of 
aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by 
peaceful means . . . adjustment or settlement of international disputes 
or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.61 
In terms of the U.N. Charter, “parties to a dispute, the continuance of which 
is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, 
first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, 
arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or 
other peaceful means of their own choice.”62 
The U.N. General Assembly and the Security Council have continuously 
reiterated the commitment of Member States to international peace and 
security. The U.N. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations of 1970 recalled “the duty of States to refrain in 
their international relations from military, political, economic or any other 
form of coercion aimed against the political independence or territorial 
integrity of any State.”63 In 1999, the General Assembly adopted a Declaration 
 
 57 Id. 
 58 U.N. Charter pmbl. 
 59 Id. art. 2, ¶ 3. 
 60 Id. art. 2, ¶ 4. 
 61 Id. art. 1, ¶ 1. 
 62 Id. art. 33. 
 63 G.A. Res. 2625 (XXXV), pmbl. (Oct. 24, 1970). 
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on a Culture of Peace, which was to be achieved through education, 
sustainable economic and social development, the promotion of human rights 
and securing equality between women and men, fostering democratic 
principles and practices, advancing understanding, tolerance, and solidarity in 
society, supporting the free flow of information and knowledge, and general 
and complete disarmament.64 In 2004, the General Assembly published a 
report on challenges that confronted the international community in creating a 
more secure world, and it listed certain strategies for meeting those challenges, 
including better international regulatory frameworks and norms (mentioning 
by name the International Criminal Court as a strategy that might deter parties 
from committing crimes against humanity and war crimes), better information 
and analysis to facilitate early-warning indications of threatening conditions, 
preventive diplomacy and mediation, and early (preventive) deployment of 
peacekeeping forces.65 Earlier, the Security Council proclaimed the year 2000 
to be the “International Year for the Culture of Peace.”66 The Security Council 
added its voice to the pursuit of peace by calling on U.N. Member States to 
support and develop a conflict prevention strategy, instructing the Secretary-
General to convey to the Council his assessment of threats to international 
peace and security, and to keep potential conflict situations under close review 
so as to take early and effective action to prevent armed conflict.67 The 
Security Council reminded Member States of their obligation to settle their 
disputes by peaceful means.68 
It is fair to conclude that, “in the present development stage of international 
law, the prohibition to use force has established itself as a generally recognized 
customary and binding principle.”69 The U.N. Charter authorizes armed 
intervention in only two instances: 
(1) Collective armed intervention under auspices of the Security 
Council as a means of putting an end to a situation that constitutes a 
threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression;70 
and 
 
 64 G.A. Res. A/53/243B, art. 3 (Oct. 6, 1999).  
 65 Rep. of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure 
World: Our Shared Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/59/565, at 35–38 (Dec. 2, 2004). 
 66 G.A. Res. 52/15 (Nov. 20, 1997). 
 67 S.C. Res. 1366, ¶¶ 3–6 (Aug. 30, 2001). 
 68 Id. ¶ 9.  
 69 Umberto Leanza, The Historical Background, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE 
CRIME OF AGGRESSION 3, 4 (Mauro Politi & Guiseppe Nesi eds., 2004). 
 70 See U.N. Charter arts. 39, 42. 
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(2) Individual or collective self-defense in cases where an armed 
attack occurred against a Member State of the United Nations.71 
This raises the question whether armed interventions other than those 
mentioned in the U.N. Charter are still, or have become, lawful within the 
confines of contemporary international humanitarian law. 
B. Authorization of Armed Interventions Not Mentioned in the U.N. Charter 
Convincing arguments can be presented for concluding that the U.N. 
Charter does not deal comprehensively with all instances of lawful armed 
interventions. The United Nations itself has gone beyond its own Charter 
provisions by affording legitimacy to instances of armed intervention not 
mentioned in the Charter, such as (a) affording to the General Assembly the 
competence to authorize armed interventions in very special circumstances, 
and (b) supporting the legitimacy of wars of liberation. 
1. The Uniting for Peace Resolution 
In 1950, when the Cold War was still in its infancy, the General Assembly 
adopted the Uniting for Peace Resolution, which provides: 
[I]f the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the 
Permanent Members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for 
the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where 
there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of 
aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter 
immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to 
Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of 
the peace or an act of aggression the use of armed force when 
necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security.72 
The Resolution was adopted as a result of Russian responses to the 
Resolution of the Security Council that authorized an armed intervention to 
resolve the Korean crisis and culminated in the Korean War (1950-1953).73 
 
 71 See id. art. 51. In cases of collective self-defense, the State for whose benefit this right is used must 
declare itself to be the victim of an armed attack. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 195 (June 27). The victim State must furthermore 
request the assistance of the other State or States participating in the collective defense of the victim State. Id. 
¶ 199. 
 72 G.A. Res. 377 (V) A, ¶ 1 (Nov. 3, 1950). 
 73 See CHRIS TOMUSCHAT, UNITING FOR PEACE 1 (2008); Rep. of the S.C., Security Council Deadlocks 
and Uniting for Peace: An Abridged History (Oct. 2013), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/ 
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The Resolution was adopted in the absence of a representative of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union), which boycotted the meeting of the 
Security Council to protest allowing Taiwan to represent China within the 
U.N.’s structures.74 In August 1950, after the return of the Soviet 
representative to the Security Council, the Soviet Union exercised its veto 
power to impede all further resolutions.75 Western countries, under the 
leadership of the United States, thereupon initiated the Uniting for Peace 
Resolution against the resistance of the Eastern Bloc to permit the General 
Assembly to resolve situations constituting “a threat to the peace, [a] breach of 
the peace, or [an] act of aggression.”76 Thus far, the Resolution has been 
invoked on ten occasions, mostly by the Security Council, to authorize 
“Emergency Special Sessions” of the General Assembly to deal with a variety 
of crisis situations.77 Although the authorization of armed force is legalized 
under the Uniting for Peace Resolution in cases of a breach of the peace or an 
act of aggression (not if the situation merely constitutes a threat to the peace), 
this power has thus far not been used by the General Assembly.78 
2. Wars of Liberation 
Wars of liberation are confined to an armed struggle against colonial rule, 
foreign domination, and racist regimes, and the legitimacy of these (and only 
 
%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Security_Council_Deadlocks_and_Uniting_for_ 
Peace.pdf [hereinafter Security Council Deadlocks and Uniting for Peace]. 
 74 TOMUSCHAT, supra note 73, at 1. 
 75 Id. 
 76 See id.; Security Council Deadlocks and Uniting for Peace, supra note 73. 
 77 The first Emergency Special Session of the General Session (Emergency Special Session) was 
convened at the request of the Security Council in 1956 to deal with a crisis in the Middle East following the 
annexation of the Suez Canal by Egypt; the second Emergency Special Session was convened at the request of 
the Security Council in 1956 to deal with a crisis in Hungary following its invasion by the Soviet Union; the 
third Emergency Special Session was convened at the request of the Security Council in 1958 to deal with a 
crisis in the Middle East in consequence of the deployment of foreign troops in Lebanon and Jordan; the fourth 
Emergency Special Session was convened at the request of the Security Council in 1960 to deal with the 
situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; the fifth Emergency Special Session was convened at the 
request of the Soviet Union and the General Assembly in 1967 to deal with measures taken by Israel to change 
the status of east Jerusalem; the sixth Emergency Special Session was convened at the request of the Security 
Council in 1980 to deal with a crisis in Afghanistan; the seventh Emergency Special Sessions was convened at 
the request of Senegal in 1980 to deal with the situation in Palestine; the eighth Emergency Special Session 
was convened at the request of the Zimbabwe in 1981 to deal with the situation in Namibia; the ninth 
Emergency Special Session was convened at the request of the Security Council in 1982 to deal with the 
situation in occupied Arab territories; the tenth Emergency Special Session was convened at the request of 
Qatar for its first session in 1997 to deal with illegal Israeli action in occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of 
the occupied territories. See Security Council Deadlocks and Uniting for Peace, supra note 73. 
 78 TOMUSCHAT, supra note 73, at 3; Security Council Deadlocks and Uniting for Peace, supra note 73. 
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these) instances of militant action have also been endorsed by the General 
Assembly.79 The General Assembly was quite explicit in saying that the 
“legitimate struggle” includes the armed struggle of liberation movements.80 
When Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of December 14, 1974 was adopted to define 
acts of aggression as guidance for the Security Council when called upon to 
exercise its Chapter VII powers, the General Assembly took special 
precautions not to adversely implicate wars of liberation. Article 7 of 
Resolution 3314 (XXIX) thus provides: 
Nothing in this definition . . . could in any way prejudice the right to 
self-determination, freedom and independence, as derived from the 
Charter [of the United Nations], of peoples forcibly deprived of that 
right and referred to in the Declaration on Principles of International 
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, particularly 
peoples under colonial and racist regimes or other forms of alien 
domination: nor the right of these peoples to struggle to that end and 
to seek and receive support, in accordance with the principles of the 
Charter and in conformity with the above-mentioned Declaration.81 
The Resolutions of the General Assembly could find support in Protocol I to 
the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, which proclaimed that wars of 
liberation―“armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial 
domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of 
their right to self-determination”―will be governed by the rules of 
international humanitarian law applying to international armed conflicts.82 
 
 79 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 3163 (XXVIII), ¶ 5 (Dec. 14, 1973) (proclaiming “the legitimacy of the struggle of 
the people under colonial and alien domination to exercise their right to self-determination and independence 
by all . . . necessary means”); G.A. Res. 3411 (XXX) G, ¶ 5 (Dec. 10, 1975) (proclaiming the legitimacy of the 
struggle against a racist regime “by all means possible”); G.A. Res. 35/206A, ¶ 1 (Dec. 16, 1980); G.A. Res. 
36/172A, ¶ 13 (Dec. 17, 1981); see also S.C. Res. 437, ¶ 4 (June 13, 1980) (proclaiming the legitimacy of the 
struggle of the South African people for the elimination of apartheid); Stephen M. Schwebel, Wars of 
Liberation―As Fought in U.N. Organs, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 446, 449 (John 
Norton Moore ed., 1974). 
 80 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 37/69A, ¶ 16 (Dec. 9, 1982); G.A. Res. 38/39A, ¶ 4 (Dec. 5, 1983). 
 81 G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), at 142 (Dec. 14, 1974). 
 82 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 1, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (1977). 
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C. Other Instances of Armed Intervention Authorized by Contemporary 
International Humanitarian Law 
The question whether the U.N. Charter provisions deal comprehensively 
with legally permissible armed interventions has mostly been debated in the 
context of (a) pre-emptive self-defense action, and (b) humanitarian 
intervention. 
1. Pre-Emptive Self-Defense Action 
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter provides in part: “Nothing in the present 
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if 
an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.”83 
Since Article 51 confines the right of Member States of the United Nations 
to take individual or collective self-defense action “if an armed attack 
occurs,”84 the question whether this provision precludes pre-emptive self-
defense is in itself problematic.85 It stands to reason, though, that a State need 
not wait for the other side to strike the first blow if it is abundantly clear and 
absolutely certain that an armed attack is imminent.86 As noted by Sir 
Humphrey Waldock: “Where there is convincing evidence not merely of 
threats and potential danger but of an attack being actually mounted, then an 
armed attack may be said to have begun to occur, though it has not passed the 
frontier.”87 
Some analysts maintain that the reference in Article 51 to “the inherent 
right of individual or collective self-defense” could arguably include pre-
 
 83 U.N. Charter art. 51. In cases of collective self-defense, the State for whose benefit this right is used 
must declare itself to be the victim of an armed attack. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 196 (June 27). The victim State must furthermore 
request the assistance of the other State or States participating in the collective defense of the victim State. Id. 
¶ 199.  
 84 U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 85 See STANIMIR A. ALEXANDROV, SELF-DEFENCE AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
165 (1996); Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Myth of Preemptive Self-Defense 5 (Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Task Force on 
Terrorism Paper, 2002), http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/02oconnell.pdf (interpreting Article 51 to mean that 
“[a]n attack must be underway or must have already occurred in order to trigger the right to unilateral self-
defense”). 
 86 See W. Michael Reisman, International Legal Responses to Terrorism, 22 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 3, 17 
(1999); see also ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE: 
BEYOND THE UN CHARTER PARADIGM 186 (1993) (stating that “[w]ith the demise of Article 2(4), it is 
reasonable to assume that this preexisting right [to pre-emptive self-defense] would be rehabilitated”). 
 87 C.H.M Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, in 
RECUEIL DES COURS 451, 498 (1952). 
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emptive action.88 The inherent right to self-defense includes more than merely 
taking defensive action after an attack has occurred; reference to individual or 
collective self-defense “if an attack occurs” was intended “to list [merely] one 
situation in which a state could clearly exercise that right.”89 
The General Assembly of the United Nations endorsed a right to pre-
emptive self-defense action, proclaiming, “a threatened State, according to 
established international law, can take military action as long as the threatened 
attack is imminent, no other means would deflect it and the action is 
proportionate.”90 In its National Security Strategy of 2002, the United States 
also endorsed the right to pre-emptive self-defense action: 
The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive 
actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The 
greater the threat, the greater the risk of inaction―and the more 
compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend 
ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the 
enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our 
adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.91 
It should be noted, though, that whereas the United States used the concepts of 
“pre-emptive” and “anticipatory” action interchangeably,92 the General 
Assembly made a distinction, defining the former concept as action “against an 
imminent or proximate threat” and the latter as action “against a non-imminent 
or non-proximate one.”93 Even though it could be argued “that the potential 
harm from some threats (e.g., terrorist armed with a nuclear weapon) is so 
great that one simply cannot risk waiting until they become imminent, and that 
less harm may be done (e.g., avoiding a nuclear exchange or radioactive fallout 
from a reactor destruction) by acting earlier,”94 international law requires “that 
if there are good arguments for preventive military action, with good evidence 
 
 88 AREND & BECK, supra note 86, at 72–73 (emphasis added); see also Mary Ellen O’Connell, Review 
Essay: Re-leashing the Dogs of War, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 446, 453 (2003); O’Connell, supra note 85, at 12. 
 89 AREND & BECK, supra note 86, at 73. 
 90 Rep. of the Secretary General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, supra note 65, ¶ 
188. 
 91 OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES 
15 (2002), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nss/nss_sep2002.pdf. 
 92 Id. Note that the author of this Article has also in the past used the two terms interchangeably. See 
Johan D. van der Vyver, Ius Contra Bellum and American Foreign Policy, 20 S. AFR. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 4–5 
(2003). 
 93 Rep. of the Secretary General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, supra note 65, ¶ 
189. 
 94 Id. 
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to support them, they should be put to the Security Council, which can 
authorize such action if it chooses to.”95 And what if the Security Council, for 
whatever reason, should not authorize anticipatory defensive action? Then, 
said the General Assembly, “there will be, by definition, time to pursue other 
strategies, including persuasion, negotiation, deterrence and containment―and 
to visit again the military option.”96 
It is commonly accepted that pre-emptive self-defense must be confined to 
the circumstances specified by former U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster 
in a diplomatic communiqué to his British counterpart, Lord Ashburton, 
following the Caroline affair which resulted from the following fact scenario.97  
During the nineteenth century, a group of rebels from Upper Canada (currently 
Ontario) revolted against British colonial rule.98 The rebels were forced to 
leave the country and took refuge on Navy Island on the American side of the 
Niagara Falls.99 Sympathizers with their cause within the United States 
supplied the rebels with money, provisions, and arms that were conveyed to 
Navy Island by SS Caroline, which was owned by a U.S. citizen.100 On 
December 29, 1837, a group of British and Canadian loyalists crossed the 
border between Canada and the United States, seized SS Caroline in American 
waters, chased away its crew, set the ship alight, and left it adrift over the 
Niagara Falls.101 In the exchange of diplomatic notes, Lord Ashburton, while 
apologizing for the invasion of United States territory, maintained that the 
destruction of SS Caroline was justified by the necessity of self-defense.102 
Secretary Webster responded that it would be up to Her Majesty’s Government 
“to show, upon what state of facts, and what rules of international law, the 
destruction of the ‘Caroline’ is to be defended,” and in particular “to show a 
necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, 
and no moment for deliberation.”103 
 
 95 Id. ¶ 190. 
 96 Id. 
 97 See, e.g., Michael J. Kelly, Time Warp To 1945—Resurrection of the Reprisal and Anticipatory Self-
Defense Doctrines in International Law, 13 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 25 (2003). 
 98 See id. 
 99 See id. 
 100 See id. 
 101 See The Caroline Case, in 2 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 409–10, 412 (John Bassett Moore ed., 
1906). 
 102 See id. at 411. 
 103 Letter from Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton (Aug. 6, 1842), in 2 JOHN MOORE DIGEST OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 411–12 (1906).  
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It has thus come to be accepted that pre-emptive self-defense action must 
be confined to cases in which the “necessity of that self-defence is instant, 
overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment of 
deliberation.”104 Jordan Paust has pointed out that the Caroline incident was 
not actually a matter of pre-emptive self-defense since it occurred in the 
process of continued attacks on the government of Canada by insurgents.105 
That may be the case, but it is equally true that Caroline has come to be 
regarded as the decisive norm governing pre-emptive military action.106 It was, 
for example, quoted by the Nuremberg Military Tribunal in the context of 
preventive armed intervention.107 Pre-emptive self-defense must therefore 
remain confined to “situations in which the imminence of an attack is so clear 
and the danger so great that defensive action is essential for self-
preservation.”108 It must also comply with the test of proportionality.109 
2. Humanitarian Intervention 
Humanitarian intervention denotes instances of armed conflict where State 
A takes military action against State B to protect the citizens of State B against 
severe atrocities committed by the powers that be of State B.110 It owes its 
origin to the writings of Grotius.111 Military intervention against ISIS has 
 
 104 Id. 
 105 Jordan J. Paust, Use of Armed Force Against Terrorists in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond, 35 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 533, 535 (2002). 
 106 See Reisman, supra note 86, at 47, 48–49; Waldock, supra note 87, at 498. 
 107 United States v. Göring, in 1 TRIALS OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE MILITARY 
TRIBUNAL 171, 207 (1947). 
 108 Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1634 (1984). 
 109 See AREND & BECK, supra note 86, at 165. 
 110 An example of this is the invasion of Uganda in 1979 by Tanzanian forces to rescue the peoples of 
Uganda from the brutal reign of terror of President Idi Amin. See U.O. Umozurike, Tanzania’s Intervention in 
Uganda, in 20 ARCHIV DES VÖLKERRECHTS 301, 312–13 (1982). Justification for the military action of NATO 
forces in 1999 within Kosovo to put an end to the repression of the peoples of that region by the Serbian 
governmental authorities can also find no other possible justification than humanitarian intervention. See 
Richard B. Bilder, Kosovo and the “New Interventionism”: Promise or Peril?, 9 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 
153 (2000). 
 111 In his seminal work on the law of war and peace, Grotius posed the question of “[w]hether there may 
be a just cause for undertaking war on behalf of the subjects of another ruler, in order to protect them from 
wrong at his hands.” HUGO GROTIUS, 2 DE JURE BELLI ET PACIS 438 (William Whewelll trans., 2011) (“Est et 
illud controversum, an justa sit belli causa pro subditis alienis, ut ab eis arceatur imperantis injuria.”). He 
answered the question in the positive, provided the wrong inflicted by the rules on his own subjects is obvious, 
explaining: “In conformity with this principle Constantine took up arms against Maxentius and Lucinius, and 
other Roman emperors either took up arms against the Persians, or threatened to do so, unless these should 
check their persecutions of the Christians on religious grounds.” Id. at 440 (“Sic in Maxentium et in Licinium 
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brought jus ad bellum relating to humanitarian intervention in contention and 
therefore requires special attention in the context of the present survey. 
There are those who bluntly deny the legality of humanitarian intervention 
without Security Council endorsement.112 Arguments in support of the 
continued legality, or the moral legitimacy, of humanitarian intervention have 
been wide-ranging.113 Justifications of humanitarian intervention can be 
reduced to three distinct approaches: (1) the literalist approach, (2) the flexible 
and teleological approach, and (3) the emergency mechanism argument. 
The literalist approach, represented by Julius Stone (1907-1985), the 
Challis Professor of Jurisprudence and International Law at the University of 
Sydney (1942-1974) and thereafter Distinguished Professor of Jurisprudence 
and International Law at the Hastings College of Law of the University of 
California, maintained that Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter does not forbid the 
threat or use of force simpliciter, but only the threat or use of force for specific 
unlawful purposes, namely “against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations.”114 Therefore, since humanitarian intervention 
does not seek to change territorial borders of the State under attack or to 
challenge the political independence of that State, it falls outside the scope of 
the Charter’s proscription.115 Furthermore, one cannot, according to Stone, 
reconcile a blanket prohibition of the threat or use of force with the provisions 
of Article 2(3) of the U.N. Charter, which calls upon Member States to settle 
international disputes by peaceful means and in such a manner that 
international peace “and justice” are not endangered.116 
 
Constantinus, in Persas alii Romanorum Imperatores arma ceperunt, aut capere minati sunt, nisi vim a 
Christianis religionis nomine arcerent.”).  
 112 See, e.g., Ilias Bantekas, Defences in International Criminal Law, in THE PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 263, 278–79 (Dominic McGoldrick et al. eds., 2004) 
(maintaining that lawful armed intervention is confined to those sanctioned by Articles 42 and 51 of the U.N. 
Charter and that anticipatory self-defense is not legitimate); Muhammad Aziz Shukri, Will Aggressors Ever Be 
Tried Before the ICC?, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 32, 34–35 
(Mauro Politi & Guiseppe Nesi eds., 2004). 
 113 See Richard B. Lillich, A United States Policy of Humanitarian Intervention and Intercession, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 278, 288–89 (Donald P. Kommers & Gilburt D. Loescher 
eds., 1979) [hereinafter Lillich, A United States Policy]. For a critical analysis of the following classification, 
see GERHARD KEMP, INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIME OF AGGRESSION 64–68 
(2010). 
 114 JULIUS STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER 95 (1958). Contra Schachter, supra note 108, at 
1633. 
 115 STONE, supra note 114, at 95. Contra Schachter, supra note 108, at 1633. 
 116 STONE, supra note 114, at 95, 98–101. 
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The flexible and teleological approach,117 represented by Michael Reisman, 
the Myres S. McDougal Professor of International Law at Yale Law School, 
argued that the prohibition of the threat or use of force must be read in 
conjunction with the overarching human rights concerns of the United Nations 
as recorded in several provisions of the U.N. Charter118 and of which 
humanitarian intervention is a logical extension.119 
The emergency mechanism argument, represented by Richard Baxter 
(1921-1980),120 Professor of Law at Harvard University (1954-1979) and 
Judge in the International Court of Justice (1979-1980), and Richard Lillich 
(1933-1996),121 Professor of International Law at the University of Virginia, 
based the justification for humanitarian intervention on a necessity deriving 
from the inability of the Security Council, due to the veto powers of the 
Permanent Members and the (then) prevailing Cold War, to execute its primary 
function of maintaining international peace and security. Under this theory, 
there is a need for humanitarian intervention exactly because the Security 
Council has been immobilized by the veto power of the Permanent 
Members.122 This presupposes that humanitarian intervention is to be 
“deactivated” should the Security Council ever begin to function smoothly.123 
Although humanitarian intervention remains “a murky area of law and 
morality,”124 there does seem to be the need for “‘a form of collective 
intervention’ beyond a veto-bound Security Council,”125 but then under strict 
conditions relating, first, to the circumstances that would justify military action 
 
 117 See Ian Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 217—
18 (John Norton Moore ed., 1974) [hereinafter Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention]. 
 118 U.N. Charter pmbl., arts. 1, 55–56. 
 119 Michael Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos, in 1 HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
AND THE UNITED NATIONS 167, 177–78 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973); see also Adam Roberts, The So-Called 
‘Right’ of Humanitarian Intervention, 3 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 3, 8 (2000). 
 120 See The Present, in 1 HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 54 (Richard B. Lillich 
ed., 1973) (statement by Richard Baxter, discussant in conference proceedings) (“It is almost as if we were 
thrown back on customary international law by a breakdown of the Charter system.”). 
 121 Lillich, A United States Policy, supra note 113, at 289; see also Richard B. Lillich, Forcible Self-Help 
by States to Protect Human Rights, 53 IOWA L. REV. 325, 335, 345–51 (1968); Richard B. Lillich, 
Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a Plea for Constructive Alternatives, in LAW AND 
CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 229, 230 (John Norton Moore ed., 1974). 
 122 See Lillich, A United States Policy, supra note 113, at 289. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Thomas W. Smith, Moral Hazard and Humanitarian Law: The International Criminal Court and the 
Limits of Legalism, 39 INT’L POL. 175, 189 (2002). 
 125 Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of “Humanitarian Intervention,” 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 824, 828 
(1999). 
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in a given situation, and second, to the manner in which it is to be executed. 
Humanitarian intervention will only be warranted in exceptional circumstances 
of extreme and ongoing violations of human rights;126 as to the execution of an 
armed intervention, collective rather than unilateral action must be the norm. 
Humanitarian intervention has thus been defined as “the use of military 
force―consensual or otherwise―by regional and international bodies to stop 
massive and systematic human rights violations.”127 Human Rights Watch has 
emphasized that nonconsensual military intervention would be justified “only 
when it is the last feasible option to avoid genocide or comparable mass 
slaughter,” and added that “given the risk to life inherent in any military action, 
only the most severe threats to life should warrant consideration of an 
international military response.”128 
A number of prominent international lawyers, on the other hand, maintain 
that humanitarian intervention is decidedly illegal but might, in special 
circumstances, derive a certain morally-defined justification, basing their 
reluctance to subscribe to the legality of humanitarian intervention on its 
potential abuse.129 Richard Falk, for example, argues that the legitimacy, if not 
the legality, of retaliation―and the same, it is submitted, would apply to 
humanitarian intervention―derives from the “acceptability” of the use of force 
in the special circumstances that prompted its use.130 According to Falk: 
The assumption underlying such an approach is that the primary role 
of international law is to help governments plan how to act, rather 
than to permit some third-party judge to determine whether contested 
action is legal or not. In fact the function of the third-party judge can 
be performed properly only by attempting to assess in what respects 
and to what extent the governmental actor “violated” community 
norms of a prescriptive nature.131 
 
 126 Dino Kritsiotis, Arguments of Mass Confusion, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 233, 273 (2004) (noting that “states 
have reserved the right of humanitarian intervention for extreme situations of acute or aggravated humanitarian 
need . . . .”). 
 127 Mahmood Monshipouri & Claude E. Welch, The Search for International Human Rights and Justice: 
Coming to Terms with the New Global Realities, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 370, 378 (2001); see also Smith, supra note 
124, at 178. 
 128 See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT (2000), https://www.hrw.org/legacy/ 
wr2k/Front.htm#TopOfPag. 
 129 Dino Kritsiotis, Reappraising Policy Objections to Humanitarian Intervention, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
1005, 1020–21 (1998); Smith, supra note 124, at 183. 
 130 See Richard A. Falk, The Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation, 63 AM. J. INT’L L. 415, 
425 (1969) (arguing that “certain behavior might be ‘acceptable’ though not legal”). 
 131 Id. at 442. 
VAN DER VYVER GALLEYSPROOFS2 3/17/2016 9:12 AM 
552 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30 
Jonathan Charney, commenting on the Kosovo bombings, likewise 
maintained that “keeping such intervention illegal and requiring states to break 
the law in extreme circumstances may be the best and most likely way to limit 
its abuse, despite not being a perfect solution.”132 The moral appeal of the use 
of force “would tend to mitigate or even overcome any perceived ‘illegality’” 
of such action.133 
Ian Brownlie also proceeded on the assumption that humanitarian 
intervention is illegal,134 though it might be morally defensible in certain 
circumstances. To proclaim humanitarian intervention lawful if confined to 
those circumstances would still leave its application open to abuse.135 
Referring to euthanasia as presenting an analogous dilemma, Brownlie argued 
that one’s responses to instances where humanitarian intervention would be 
justified by “higher considerations of public policy and moral choice”136 
should be conditioned by “moderation” while leaving the principle of its 
illegality intact: “[m]oderation in application does not necessarily display a 
legislative intent to cancel the principle so applied.”137 
III. THE ISIS CRISIS 
The atrocities committed by ISIL/ISIS referred to above138 raise the 
question of what military action can be taken by the international community 
of States or by individual sovereignties to combat the threat emanating from 
the crime of aggression and the acts of terror violence. Part III argues that 
existing norms of jus ad bellum do not unconditionally authorize military 
intervention across national borders against ISIS strongholds. Several States 
have nevertheless launched airstrikes against ISIS targets in Iraq and in Syria. 
 
 132 Jonathan I. Charney, Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 834, 838 
(1999); see also Wolfgang G. Friedman, Comment 4., in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 574, 
578–79 (John Norton Moore ed., 1974) (maintaining that concepts such as humanitarian intervention have “at 
best attained the level of accepted international morality rather than law”). 
 133 Falk, supra note 130, at 439 (also proclaiming that “[a] rule of conduct isolated from context is often 
too abstract to guide choice of action”). 
 134 Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 117, at 226. 
 135 Id. at 223, 225; see also Ian Brownlie, Thoughts on Kind-Hearted Gunmen, in HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 139, 147–48 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973) [hereinafter Brownlie, 
Thoughts]; Schachter, supra note 108, at 1629. 
 136 Brownlie, Thoughts, supra note 135, at 146. 
 137 Id. 
 138 See supra Part II.A. 
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The airstrikes were not authorized by the Security Council of the United 
Nations. The Security Council in a Resolution of August 15, 2014 called on 
Member States  
to take all measures as may be necessary and appropriate and in 
accordance with their obligations under international law to counter 
incitement of terrorist acts motivated by extremism and intolerance 
perpetrated by individuals or entities associated with ISIL, ANF [Al 
Nusrah Front] and Al-Qaida and to prevent the subversion of 
educational, cultural, and religious institutions by terrorists and their 
supporters.139  
Although “measures as may be necessary and appropriate” could be taken 
to include armed force, it was generally understood that the Resolution was not 
intended to authorize an armed intervention. The representative of the Russian 
Federation, who supported the Resolution, stated quite emphatically that “it 
should not be taken as approval for military action.”140 The Syrian 
representative, who also supported the Resolution, which was adopted 
unanimously, called upon the Security Council “in the future, to consult with 
his country and others in the region in order to make its actions against 
terrorism effective.”141 The legality of airstrikes in Iraq and Syria can therefore 
not be based on Security Council authorization under its Chapter VII powers. 
The military intervention by Western States in Iraq and Syria can also not 
be justified on the basis of humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian 
intervention is essentially conducted against the armed forces of a State and is 
aimed at the toppling of a repressive government.142 ISIS does not comprise 
the armed forces of a State and is not the government of any State. Nor can it 
be brought within the confines of pre-emptive self-defense action, as will be 
noted more specifically hereafter. 
The judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the case of 
Nicaragua v. United States is clear authority for the proposition that a 
government may seek military assistance from other governments to repress a 
militant uprising within its borders, but military support by a foreign 
 
 139 S.C. Res. 2170, ¶ 6 (Aug. 15, 2014). 
 140 See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Adopts Resolution 2170 (2014) Condemning 
Gross, Widespread Abuse of Human Rights by Extremist Groups in Iraq, Syria, U.N. Press Release SC/11520 
(Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11520.doc.htm (quoting statement by Petr V. Iliichev, 
Russian Federation Representative). 
 141 Id. (quoting statement by Bashar Ja’afari, Syrian Representative). 
 142 See supra Part II.C.2. 
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government of the insurgent forces constitutes an infringement of state 
sovereignty and a violation of international law.143 Iraq has therefore, within 
the framework of contemporary international humanitarian law, requested 
military support from the United Kingdom,  the United States, and a 
number of other Western allies, in its armed struggle against ISIS. 
On September 26, 2014, the British House of Commons adopted, by 524 
votes to 43, the following motion: 
That this House condemns the barbaric acts of ISIL against the 
peoples of Iraq including the Sunni, Shia, Kurds, Christians and 
Yazidi and the humanitarian crisis this is causing; recognizes the 
clear threat ISIL poses to the territorial integrity of Iraq and the 
request from the Government of Iraq for military support from the 
international community and the specific request to the UK 
Government for such support; further recognizes the threat ISIL 
poses to wider international security and the UK directly through its 
sponsorship of terrorist attacks and its murder of a British hostage; 
acknowledges the broad coalition contributing to military support of 
the Government of Iraq including countries throughout the Middle 
East; further acknowledges the request of the Government of Iraq for 
international support to defend itself against the threat ISIL poses to 
Iraq and its citizens and the clear legal basis that this provides for 
action in Iraq; notes that this motion does not endorse UK air strikes 
in Syria as part of this campaign and any proposal to do so would be 
subject to a separate vote in Parliament; accordingly supports Her 
Majesty’s Government, working with allies, in supporting the 
Government of Iraq in protecting civilians and restoring its territorial 
integrity, including the use of UK air strikes to support Iraqi, 
including Kurdish, security forces’ efforts against ISIL in Iraq; notes 
that Her Majesty’s Government will not deploy UK troops in ground 
combat operations; and offers its wholehearted support to men and 
women of Her Majesty’s armed forces.144 
It is important to note that authorization by the House of Commons was 
confined to an armed intervention in the requesting State only.145 Confining 
British military support to operations in Iraq was based on the fact that Syria 
 
 143 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 
Rep. 14, ¶ 195–98 (June 27).  
 144 26 Sept. 2014, Parl Deb HC (2014) col. 1255 (UK); see also DEFENCE COMMITTEE, THE SITUATION IN 
IRAQ AND SYRIA AND THE RESPONSE TO AL-DAWLA AL-ISLAMIYA FI AL-IRAWAL-SHAM (DAESH), 2014-15, 
HC 690, at 15 (UK) [hereinafter DAESH Report]. 
 145 See DAESH Report, supra note 144, at 15 (noting that the House of Commons authorized air strikes in 
Iraq). 
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has not requested the United Kingdom to attack ISIS strongholds in that 
country. However, on December 2, 2015, the House of Commons approved, by 
397 votes to 223, airstrikes against ISIS targets in Syria.146 
On March 30, 2015, the Canadian House of Commons approved by 
majority vote a government proposal to extend the military campaign in Iraq 
for up to one year and to authorize airstrikes in Syria.147 Initially confining 
British military support to operations in Iraq was based on the fact that Syria 
had not requested the United Kingdom (or Canada or the United States) to 
attack ISIS strongholds in that country.148 However, the United States did 
launch air attacks against al-Qaeda targets in Syria.149 
Even though the U.S. Constitution requires congressional approval before 
going to war,150 President Obama initially did not request the consent of 
Congress for the military interventions in Iraq and Syria.151 He essentially 
based the legality of the airstrikes on the 2001 Authorization for Use of 
Military Force, which authorized the President to use “all necessary and 
appropriate force” against those whom he determined “planned, authorized, 
committed or aided” the September 11 attacks,152 and the 2002 Authorization 
for Use of Military Force against Iraq, which authorized the President “to use 
the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and 
appropriate in order to (1) defend the national security of the United States 
against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and (2) enforce all relevant United 
Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.”153 
 
 146 See Patrick Winour, Britain Carries Out First Syria Airstrikes After MPs Approve Action Against Isis, 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 3, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/02/syria-airstrikes-mps-approve-uk-
action-against-isis-after-marathon-debate. 
 147 Mark Kennedy, Parliament Votes 149-129 to Widen Canada’s Mission Against ISIS to Syria and 
Extend It for a Year, NAT’L POST (Mar. 31, 2015), http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/canadian-
politics/parliament-votes-149-129-to-widen-canadas-mission-against-isis-to-syria-and-extend-it-for-a-year. 
 148 See DAESH Report, supra note 144, at 16 (noting that the U.K.’s authorization was based on the Iraqi 
government’s request for intervention). 
 149 See, e.g., Syria: US Begins Air Strikes on Islamic State Targets, BBC NEWS (Sept. 23, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29321136. 
 150 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
 151 See Stimson, supra note 46, at 1. 
 152 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 STAT. 224 (2001); see also KEN 
GUDE, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, UNDERSTANDING AUTHORIZATIONS FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE 1 
(2014), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/UnderstandingAUMFs.pdf; Stimson, 
supra note 46 (noting that the Administration believes that the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force 
offers “sufficient legal authority”). 
 153 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-243, § 3, 
116 Stat. 1498 (2002); see also GUDE, supra note 152, at 3. 
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Suffice it to say that it requires quite a stretch of the imagination to 
construe a link between the bombing campaign against ISIS (or ISIL, as 
American spokespersons prefer to call it) and the terrorist attack of September 
11th or the invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
Nevertheless, there might after all be some merit in this madness. Since the 
Obama Administration based the legality of the airstrikes against ISIS targets 
under municipal law on the 2001 authorization by Congress of the War on 
Terror ignited by al-Qaeda on September 11 and on the 2002 authorization by 
Congress of the invasion of Iraq, and those armed attacks did not involve ISIS 
at all, current airstrikes against al-Qaeda targets were in all likelihood intended 
to afford a degree of credence to relying on the 2001 and 2002 congressional 
authorizations for the airstrikes of 2014 and thereafter against ISIS. Relying on 
the 2001 and 2002 congressional authorizations in any event remains 
farfetched. 
Referring to ISIL instead of ISIS by American spokespersons is probably 
insisted upon in order to justify reliance for the current bombing campaign in 
Iraq on the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force.154 Al-Qaeda was part 
of ISIL but is not part of ISIS.155 That, too, is probably the reason why the 
United States has not confined its armed attacks to ISIS targets in Iraq but has 
also engaged in airstrikes against al-Qaeda targets in Syria. 
So, why not simply obtain congressional authorization for the current 
airstrikes targeting ISIS? It is quite likely that the Obama Administration feels 
constrained because Congress may decline to authorize those airstrikes. 
Concerns have been raised by several members of Congress that airstrikes in 
the Middle East without the backing of U.S. soldiers on the ground would be 
futile.156 Furthermore, there are clear indications that a substantial number of 
Republicans will oppose any action triggered by an Obama initiative by virtue 
of their strong opposition to his administration, irrespective of the merits of 
those initiatives.157 It might be noted that the Obama Administration did on 
 
 154 See Withnall supra note 45; see also Stimson, supra note 46, at 3. 
 155 See Holmes, supra note 15; Mapping Militant Organizations: The Islamic State, supra note 14; Zelin, 
supra note 10. 
 156 See David Martosko, Boehner Says US Might ‘have no choice’ But to Send Combat Troops to Fight 
Against ISIS, DAILY MAIL (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2773747/Boehner-says-
US-no-choice-send-combat-troops-fight-against-ISIS.html. 
 157 See, e.g., Russell Berman, The War Against ISIS Will Go Undeclared, ATLANTIC (Apr. 15, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/the-war-against-isis-will-go-undeclared/390618/; Amber 
Phillips, President Obama’s Push for Military Authorization to Fight ISIS Won’t Go Anywhere in Congress. 
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February 12, 2015 submit a proposal to Congress for the authorization of 
“ground combat operations in other, more limited circumstances,” including 
rescue operations and special forces operations to “take military action against 
ISIL leadership.”158 However, the legality of the current military intervention 
in Iraq and Syria under the municipal law of the United States is beyond the 
reach of this survey. This present Article is concerned with the legality of the 
airstrikes under the prevailing norms of customary international law. 
Within the confines of international humanitarian law, the airstrikes in Iraq 
by United States and other national armed forces are clearly lawful because 
they were approved, and indeed requested, by the government of Iraq. The 
airstrikes in Syria are most likely not lawful under the existing laws and 
practices of international humanitarian law because they were not invited by 
the government of Syria. The judgment of the ICJ in Nicaragua v. United 
States can be cited in support of these assessments.159 The United States 
allegedly informed Syria of its intended airstrikes and requested the Syrian 
government not to intervene160―and Syria as a matter of fact did not intervene. 
Could this be interpreted as implied consent? Probably not! 
As noted earlier, the airstrikes were not authorized by the U.N. Security 
Council,161 and also cannot be justified as a matter of humanitarian 
intervention, since they were not designed to topple a repressive 
government.162 It would seem, therefore, that the legality of the airstrikes in 
Syria do not come within the confines of existing rules of jus ad bellum. 
However, a new rule of international humanitarian law is currently in the 
making, which can be called the “unwilling or unable” paradigm. 
A. The “Unwilling or Unable” Rationale 
International humanitarian law is currently in the making of what has come 
to be denoted as the “unwilling or unable” paradigm, which is aimed at 
 
Here’s Why, WASH. POST (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/12/07/3-
reasons-congress-wont-authorize-obamas-use-of-force-against-the-islamic-state/. 
 158 Letter from U.S. President Barack Obama to Congress (Feb. 11, 2015), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/11/letter-president-authorization-use-united-states-
armed-forces-connection. 
 159 See supra text accompanying note 142. 
 160 Sam Dagher et al., Syria Says U.S. Told it of Coming Airstrikes Against Islam State, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 
23, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-arab-allies-launch-airstrikes-against-islamic-state-targets-in-syria-
1411467879. 
 161 See supra notes 139–41 and accompanying text. 
 162 See supra Part II.C.2. 
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authorizing military action by State A against terrorist groups located in State 
B if the government of State B is either unwilling or unable to prevent its 
territory from being used as a launching pad for acts of terror violence.163 
Although some proponents of the unwilling or unable paradigm sought to bring 
the military response against the perpetrators of terror violence under the rubric 
of the right to self-defense,164 it will appear that its implementation is not 
confined to situations that will warrant pre-emptive defensive military action 
as required by contemporary international humanitarian law. 
The newly devised justification for militant self-defense and humanitarian 
action‒‒the unwilling or unable rationale‒‒first appeared in a letter from 
Ambassador Samantha Power, representative of the United States of America 
to the United Nations, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, dated 
September 23, 2014. In the letter she justified the airstrikes in Syria along the 
following lines: 
ISIL and other terrorist groups in Syria are a threat not only to Iraq, 
but also to many other countries, including the United States and our 
partners in the region and beyond. States must be able to defend 
themselves, in accordance with the inherent right of individual and 
collective self-defense, as reflected in Article 51 [o]f the UN Charter, 
when, as is the case here, the government of the State where the 
threat is located is unwilling or unable to prevent the use of its 
territory for such attacks. The Syrian regime has shown that it cannot 
and will not confront these safe-havens effectively itself.165 
Although Ambassador Power sought to bring the military action resorted to 
under the rubric of the unwilling or unable rationale as a matter of self-defense 
so as to bring it within the confines of the prevailing norms of jus ad bellum, it 
must again be emphasized that the United States was neither attacked nor 
under threat of an imminent attack by ISIS. Given the restricted circumstances 
under which a U.N. Member State can invoke the right to self-defense,166 it 
should be evident that an armed intervention against terrorists operating from 
 
 163 See, e.g., Deeks, supra note 6, at 486. 
 164 See, e.g., Philip Alston, The CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond Borders 17–18 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of 
Law, Pub. Law Research Paper No. 11-64, 2011) (noting that the use of force by State A in the territory of 
State B will be lawful if State A has a right to use force in self-defense under international law and State B “is 
unwilling or unable to stop armed attacks” against State A). 
 165 Jens David Ohlin, The Unwilling or Unable Doctrine Comes to Life, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 23, 2014), 
http://opiniojuris.org/2014/09/23/unwilling-unable-doctrine-comes-life/ (citing the letter from Samantha J. 
Power to Ban Ki-moon). 
 166 See supra Part II.A. 
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within the borders of a State whose government is unwilling or unable to 
counteract their evil deeds is not confined to a self-defense justification. 
On the domestic front, the unwilling or unable rationale was also endorsed 
by several prominent state officials. John Brennan, Assistant to the President 
for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, in remarks addressed to the 
Program on Law and Security of Harvard Law School in 2011, stressed the 
need to strengthen the security of the United States while upholding the values 
embedded in the laws of the country.167 He emphasized that while the United 
States will uphold legal principles of state sovereignty and the laws of war, it 
“reserve[s] the right to take unilateral action if or when other governments are 
unwilling or unable to take the necessary actions themselves.”168 Attorney-
General Eric Holder, speaking at Northwestern University School of Law in 
2012, had this to say: 
[T]here are instances where our government has a clear 
authority―and, I would argue, the responsibility―to defend the 
United States through the appropriate and lawful use of lethal force . . 
. . This does not mean that we can use military force whenever and 
wherever we want. International legal principles, including respect 
for another nation’s sovereignty, constrain our ability to act 
unilaterally. But the use of force in foreign territory would be 
consistent with these international legal principles if conducted, for 
example, with the consent of the nation involved―or after a 
determination that the nation is unable or unwilling to deal effectively 
with a threat to the United States.169 
In December 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty published a report, The Responsibility to Protect, which can be 
identified as the original source of the unwilling or unable rationale for an 
armed intervention.170 The Commission proclaimed in summary: “Where a 
population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, 
 
 167 See John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. & Counterterrorism, The White 
House Strengthening Our Security and Adhering to Our Values and Laws (Sept. 16, 2011), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-
adhering-our-values-an. 
 168 Id.; see Rosa Brooks, Lessons for International Law from the Arab Spring, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 
713, 727 (2013). 
 169 Brooks, supra note 168, at 727; see also Eric Holder, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney 
General Eric Holder Speaks at Northwestern University School of Law (Mar. 5, 2012), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-speaks-northwestern-university-school-law. 
 170 See generally INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT (2001), http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf. 
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repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to 
halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international 
responsibility to protect.”171 
The Commission drew a distinction between “the responsibility to protect” 
and “the right to intervene,” giving preference to protection rather than 
intervention: “[I]t is only if the state is unable or unwilling to fulfill this 
responsibility [to protect], or is itself the perpetrator, that it becomes the 
responsibility of the international community to act in its place.”172 It is 
important that the international community comes to accept a “culture of 
prevention” rather than a “culture of reaction.”173 The right to take military 
action in the event of unwillingness and inability of the state in question can 
manifest itself on two fronts: self-defense and humanitarian intervention. The 
Commission thus proposed the extension of the right to self-defense within the 
confines of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter “to include the right to launch 
punitive raids into neighboring countries that had shown themselves unwilling 
or unable to stop their territory being used as a launching pad for cross-border 
armed raids or terrorist attacks.”174 As far as humanitarian intervention is 
concerned, the Commission identified an “emerging principle” of international 
humanitarian law that affords legality to “intervention for human protection 
purposes, including military intervention in extreme cases . . . when major 
harm to civilians is occurring or imminently apprehended, and the state in 
question is unable or unwilling to end the harm, or is itself the perpetrator.”175 
The Commission emphasized, though, that humanitarian intervention by armed 
forces must remain “an exceptional and extraordinary measure” that can only 
be resorted to if “serious and irreparable harm . . . to human beings” is 
occurring, or is likely to occur imminently.176 Military intervention for 
humanitarian protection purposes is, in the opinion of the Commission, 
justified in two “broad sets of circumstances” only, 
namely in order to halt or avert: 
large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent 
or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state 
neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or 
 
 171 Id. at XI, ¶ (1)(B). 
 172 Id. ¶ 2.29. 
 173 Id. ¶ 3.42. 
 174 Id. ¶ 2.10. 
 175 Id. ¶ 2.25. 
 176 Id. ¶ 4.18. 
VAN DER VYVER GALLEYSPROOFS2 3/17/2016 9:12 AM 
2016] THE ISIS CRISIS 561 
large scale ‘ethnic cleansing,’ actual or apprehended, whether 
carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.177 
The Commission maintained that these conditions are in conformity with 
the “just cause” component of a decision to intervene.178 The acts of terror 
violence executed by ISIS clearly come within the confines of these 
indisputable components of a just cause. 
Bringing the unwilling or unable paradigm of armed intervention within the 
fold of humanitarian intervention is problematic, since humanitarian 
intervention as currently perceived is aimed at toppling a repressive 
government.179 Military intervention by State A against terrorist groups in 
State B in cases where State B is unwilling or unable to repress the acts of 
terrorism committed or orchestrated within its borders is directed against the 
terrorist groups.180 It does not aim at toppling the unwilling or unable 
government.181 
Basing the legality of military action against terrorists operating from 
within a territory under the rule of a government that is unwilling or unable to 
repress the acts of terror violence orchestrated from within its border on the 
right to self-defense proclaimed in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter is also 
problematic. Countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, the 
Russian Federation, and Canada, that have been executing airstrikes against 
ISIS strongholds in Iraq and Syria have not been attacked by ISIS, and such 
attacks are also not imminent as required by contemporary international 
humanitarian law to afford legality to pre-emptive self-defense action within 
the confines stipulated in the Caroline affair. It is fair to conclude, therefore, 
that the unwilling or unable paradigm cannot be justified under existing norms 
of international humanitarian law but is a new rule of jus ad bellum in the 
making. 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
In June 2001, the U.N. Secretary-General submitted a report to the General 
Assembly at the request of the Security Council, the Prevention of Armed 
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Conflict, in which it aspired towards moving “the international community 
from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention.”182 Past experiences have 
shown 
that the earlier the root causes of a potential conflict are identified 
and effectively addressed, the more likely it is that the parties to a 
conflict will be ready to engage in a constructive dialogue, address 
the actual grievances that lie at the root of the potential conflict and 
refrain from the use of force to achieve their aims.183 
The report identified as “root causes” of armed conflicts, “socio-economic 
inequities and inequalities, systematic ethnic discrimination, denial of human 
rights, disputes over political participation or long-standing grievances over 
land and other resource allocation.”184 It asserted that “the primary 
responsibility for conflict prevention rests with national Governments and 
other local actors,”185 whose “long-term effective preventive strategies” can 
include “political, developmental, humanitarian and human rights programmes 
[sic],”186 as well as “investment in sustainable development.”187 
Among the many sustainable strategies that should be pursued in order to 
achieve long-term prevention of armed conflict is “a focus on strengthening 
respect for human rights and addressing core issues of human rights violations, 
wherever [they] occur.”188 Special mention is made of the “vital role” that the 
International Criminal Court will have “in deterring the most flagrant violation 
of human rights through the enforcement of international criminal 
responsibility.”189 Looking at world events that followed the compilation of 
this noble report, one cannot but cry in despair. 
This Article is not focused on the causes as such of armed conflicts, but 
rather on the military responses to acts of orchestrated violence. In this regard, 
it would seem that international humanitarian law always lags behind the 
times. Conventions regulating the conduct of armed conflicts are drafted with 
past experiences in mind, and are, as far as means and methods of conducting 
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armed interventions are concerned, almost invariably outdated at the time of 
their adoption. The Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 were designed 
with a view to the perceptions of armed conflict that were evidenced by World 
War II at a time when armed conflicts of that kind were no longer common. 
Protocols were added to the 1949 Conventions in 1977 with a view toward 
including guerilla warfare in the concept of armed conflict, but again this was 
at a time when belligerents embarked on other means and methods of 
conducting hostilities. Further, the international community of States is yet to 
come to grips with modern technology as a means of combat, as exemplified 
by newly devised strategies of cyber warfare. 
The unwilling and unable rationale bypassed international conventions as a 
source of international humanitarian law in order to cope, as a matter of great 
urgency, with acts of terrorism as a means of conducting hostilities. I would 
suggest that if States were to take action that is not authorized by international 
law, the rationale of such action can become a new norm of customary 
international law, provided two conditions are satisfied, namely: (a) the action 
taken is not expressly prohibited by international law, and (b) the action taken 
receives general approval of a cross section of the international community of 
States.190 It seems evident that the unwilling and unable paradigm complies 
with these criteria. 
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